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When the Back Office 
Moved to the Front Burner: 
Settlement Fails in the 
Treasury Market after 9/11
n Thursday, October 4, 2001, the U.S. Treasury
 announced an unprecedented “snap,” or same-day, 
auction of a coupon-bearing security. The auction reopened 
the on-the-run ten-year note and increased the outstanding 
supply of the note from $12 billion to $18 billion. The Treasury 
stated that the offering had “nothing to do with an increase of 
funding needs on our part” (Bloomberg 2001a). Rather, it sold 
the securities to help resolve an extraordinary volume of 
settlement fails precipitated by the attacks of September 11.
A settlement fail occurs when securities are not delivered 
and paid for on the date originally scheduled by a buyer and 
seller.1 Fails are important because they expose market 
participants to the risk of loss in the event of counterparty 
insolvency. The prospect of such loss leads participants to 
devote resources to monitoring and controlling counterparty 
exposure and could, in an extreme case, lead them to limit 
their secondary-market trading. Treasury’s statement that it 
reopened the ten-year note to avoid damage to “the price 
discovery process and the smooth operating of the Treasury 
market” (New York Times 2001) suggests that policymakers 
were aware of the latter possibility.
This article describes the institutional and economic setting 
of the fails problem and suggests why that problem led 
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• Following the September 11 attacks, many sellers 
of Treasury securities failed to meet their obligation 
to deliver the securities on the scheduled date. 
Settlement “fails” jumped from $1.7 billion a day in 
the week ending September 5 to $190 billion a day 
in the week ending September 19.
• Fails rose initially because of the destruction of 
trade records and communication facilities. They 
remained high because the method typically used 
to avert or remedy a fail—borrowing a security 
through a special collateral repurchase 
agreement—proved as costly as failing to deliver 
the security.
• The U.S. Treasury responded to the fails problem 
by reopening the on-the-run ten-year note. The 
increased supply made borrowing the note more 
attractive than failing.
• Alternative solutions to chronic fails include the 
creation of a Treasury facility that could lend 
specific securities on a temporary basis and the 
institution of a penalty fee for fails.
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policymakers to depart so significantly from previous debt 
management practices. The next section sets the stage by 
reviewing how investors establish beneficial ownership of 
Treasury securities and how those securities are traded in the 
secondary market. We then describe the machinery that 
supports the secondary market: the settlement process and 
repurchase agreements (RPs) for financing long and short 
positions. A description of how settlement fails come about in 
the normal course of trading is then offered, along with an 
explanation of how fails are cured. Next, we review conditions 
in the Treasury market following September 11, explain how 
those conditions led to an extraordinary volume of fails, and 
describe the responses of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. 
Alternative mechanisms for alleviating chronic fails are then 
examined.
Owning and Trading Treasury 
Securities
Most marketable Treasury securities are owned, directly or 
indirectly, through the Fedwire Book-Entry Securities 
Transfer System (Fedwire), an electronic safekeeping and 
transfer system operated by the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury (Stigum 1988, Chapter 7). Only depository 
institutions and certain other designated entities can open 
Fedwire accounts and own Treasury securities directly in 
their own accounts. Other investors establish ownership 
indirectly through custodial relationships with depository 
institutions in which a custodian institution holds investors’ 
commingled securities in its Fedwire account and maintains 
a record of the securities’ beneficial owners. In some cases, 
there may be one or more additional custodians standing 
between a depository institution and the beneficial owners 
(Martin 1985).
Most secondary-market transactions in Treasury securities 
are executed with dealers that make markets in the securities 
(Fleming 1997; Dupont and Sack 1999). Treasury dealers range 
from regional banks and small broker-dealer firms 
to large, nationally prominent banks and broker-dealers. 
A “primary” dealer is one that has agreed to make markets to 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York when it is conducting 
open market operations and that has satisfied other criteria 
prescribed by the New York Fed.2
Treasury dealers also trade among themselves to manage 
their inventory positions and risk exposures. They sell 
securities in the course of reducing positions acquired from 
customers, they buy securities to rebuild inventories 
depleted by sales to customers, and they purchase and sell 
highly liquid on-the-run issues to manage their exposure to 
interest rate risk. (An on-the-run security is the most 
recently auctioned security in a particular series, for 
example, the most recently auctioned ten-year note. An off-
the-run security is one that is no longer on the run. Fleming 
[2002] documents liquidity differences between on-the-run 
and off-the-run securities.)
Most inter-dealer trading is conducted through brokers that 
sponsor electronic trading systems where dealers can enter bids 
and offers, hit a bid posted by another dealer, and lift the offer 
of another dealer (Boni and Leach 2001). Trading through an 
inter-dealer broker is on a blind basis: the broker does not 
disclose the name of the buyer to the seller, or the name of the 
seller to the buyer. During 2001, primary dealers traded an 
average of $306 billion a day in Treasuries: $150 billion 
through brokers and $156 billion otherwise.3
Settling Secondary-Market 
Transactions
To understand the nature of the settlement problem in the 
Treasury market after September 11, one needs to understand 
how Treasury securities settle in normal times. Most 
secondary-market transactions are for settlement, that is, 
delivery of securities to the buyer and payment of the invoice 
price to the seller, one business day after the trade date. This is 
known as “regular” settlement. However, a buyer and seller 
may agree to some alternative settlement, including “cash” 
settlement on the trade date or “forward” settlement on a date 
following the next business day.
Dealers play a central role in the settlement process because 
the vast majority of secondary-market transactions are either 
between an investor and a dealer or between two dealers. Many 
of the largest dealers maintain custodial accounts at one of two 
“clearing” banks—JPMorgan Chase Bank (JPMC) and the 
Bank of New York (BoNY)—that offer specialized dealer 
settlement services.4
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Bilateral Settlement
Suppose an investor sells Treasury notes to a dealer for regular 
settlement. Following negotiation of the terms of the sale (and 
usually after the close of business on the trade date), the 
investor instructs its custodian depository institution to deliver 
the notes and to collect the invoice price on the settlement date.
On the settlement date, the investor’s custodian instructs 
Fedwire to transfer notes that the custodian knows to be 
beneficially owned by the investor from the Fedwire account of 
the custodian to the Fedwire account of the dealer’s clearing 
bank, to collect the invoice price from the Fedwire account of 
the dealer’s clearing bank, and to notify the dealer’s clearing 
bank that the notes are to be credited to the dealer’s custodial 
account. This is known as “delivery versus payment” because 
delivery of the securities occurs simultaneously with collection 
of the invoice price (Bank for International Settlements 1992). 
The funds are credited directly to the Fedwire account of the 
investor’s custodian, and ultimately to the investor’s custodial 
account.
A similar process takes place if an investor purchases notes 
from a dealer. On the settlement date, the dealer instructs 
(through software provided by its clearing bank) Fedwire to 
transfer notes beneficially owned by the dealer from the 
Fedwire account of the dealer’s clearing bank to the Fedwire 
account of the investor’s custodian and to collect the invoice 
price.
If the dealer’s clearing bank and the investor’s custodian are 
the same depository institution, securities are transferred from 
the seller to the buyer, and funds are transferred from the buyer 
to the seller, on the books of the common custodian and 
without Fedwire activity.
A sale of less than $50 million (principal amount) is usually 
delivered in a single block. Larger sales are delivered in multiple 
separate blocks of $50 million each plus (if required) a “tail” 
piece.5 This means that a dealer that sells $175 million of 
two-year notes to a single buyer does not have to accumulate 
(during the course of the settlement day) a $175 million 
position in the notes before making delivery. The dealer can 
deliver part of the sale as soon as it has assembled a $50 million 
block, and deliver more later as it receives notes from its own 
purchases.
The Government Securities Clearing 
Corporation
Prior to 1989, bilateral settlement of inter-dealer trades 
compelled dealers to redeliver arriving securities repeatedly. 
The Government Securities Clearing Corporation (GSCC) 
was organized in the late 1980s to simplify the settlement 
process, to reduce the volume of Fedwire transfers, and to 
mitigate risk arising from counterparty exposures. Until 
2002, GSCC was owned primarily by its members and 
operated on a not-for-profit basis. (In January 2002, GSCC 
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corporation.) GSCC’s membership includes—but 
is not limited to—all of the primary dealers, a number of 
banks and broker-dealers that are not primary dealers, and 
the inter-dealer brokers.6
The Government Securities Clearing Corporation facilitates 
the comparison of trades between members, reduces deliveries 
to the smallest possible volume, and steps in as the 
counterparty in the net settlement of all compared trades. 
GSCC is not a depository institution and does not have a 
Fedwire account. It divides its settlement business between 
BoNY (for notes) and JPMC (for bills, bonds, STRIPS, and 
inflation-indexed securities).
Trade Comparison
A trade is said to be “compared” when both the buyer and the 
seller have acknowledged the transaction and agreed to its 
terms, usually to a third party. Following a direct trade between 
two GSCC members, each member sends an advisory message 
to GSCC identifying the counterparty, the security, the 
quantity of the security, the invoice price, and the settlement 
date. GSCC deems the trade compared when it has matching 
information from the two parties.
Following a brokered trade between two GSCC members, 
the broker sends two messages to GSCC: one identifying the 
buyer and the terms of the trade, the other identifying the seller 
and the terms of the trade. Additionally, the buyer and seller 
each send messages of their own, identifying the terms of the 
trade, the broker, and their role (buyer or seller) in the 
transaction. GSCC compares the seller’s message with the 
corresponding broker’s message and the buyer’s message with 
The Government Securities Clearing 
Corporation facilitates the comparison
of trades between members, reduces 
deliveries to the smallest possible volume, 
and steps in as the counterparty in the net 
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the other broker’s message separately. This two-part process is 
required because brokered trading is on a blind basis: a buyer 
and seller do not know each other’s identity either before or 
after agreeing to a trade.
Net Settlement
After the cessation of trading at the end of a business day, 
GSCC computes, from all compared trades, the net obligation 
of each member to either receive or deliver securities the next 
business day, on an issue-by-issue basis.7 Then, in a process 
known as “novation,” that is, the substitution of a new legal 
obligation for an old one, GSCC steps in as the counterparty to 
every member. A member with a net obligation to deliver a 
security is instructed to deliver the security to GSCC; a member 
with a net obligation to receive a security is advised that it will 
receive the security from GSCC. (The deliveries to and receives 
from GSCC net to zero in every security. GSCC does not trade 
securities for its own account and is only a conduit for 
settlement purposes.) At the same time, GSCC instructs the 
clearing banks what securities it expects to receive and how 
much to pay for the securities, and it instructs the banks where 
the securities should be redelivered and how much to collect 
upon redelivery. 
The primary advantage of this net settlement system is that 
each GSCC member need only deliver its net sales (or receive 
its net purchases), instead of both delivering its gross sales and 
receiving its gross purchases. On an average day in 2001, GSCC 
compared and netted about 55,000 transactions with a market 
value of about $1.4 trillion. The transactions netted down 
to an average of about 11,000 deliveries with a value of about 
$400 billion (Government Securities Clearing Corporation 
2002, p. 2).
GSCC creates deliver and receive instructions in pairs. Each 
instruction to deliver a security to GSCC is paired with, or 
“bound” to, an instruction to receive an equal size block of the 
same security from GSCC. After the opening of Fedwire on a 
settlement day, GSCC begins to receive blocks of securities 
pursuant to the delivery instructions that it created the 
preceding night and promptly (in a matter of seconds) 
redelivers those blocks pursuant to its own novated delivery 
obligations. GSCC’s practice of creating deliver and receive 
instructions in matched and bound pairs facilitates immediate 
redelivery because it never has to wait for additional securities 
to come in to make up an outgoing block.
Transaction Adjustment Payments
All deliveries of a security to GSCC, and all redeliveries of the 
same security from GSCC, are made against payment at a 
common current market value (CMV). The CMV of a security 
is a representative price and is not necessarily equal to the price 
of any particular transaction. GSCC marks the transactions of 
each of its members in a security to the security’s CMV by 
adding up the net excess of a member’s purchase prices over the 
security’s CMV and subtracting the net excess of the member’s 
sale prices over the CMV. These net amounts are aggregated 
across all of the member’s securities to produce a transaction 
adjustment payment. If the adjustment payment is greater than 
zero, the member is required to pay it into a GSCC account at 
BoNY by 10 a.m. on the settlement date. If it is negative, GSCC 
agrees to pay it out to the member by 11 a.m.
Financing Long and Short Positions
Some market participants, especially dealers and hedge funds, 
commonly commit themselves to paying amounts in excess of 
their cash balances when they purchase Treasury securities. 
Moreover, they sometimes sell more securities than they own, 
or sell securities short. In the former case, they have to borrow 
money to make the payment due upon delivery. In the latter 
case, they have to borrow securities to make delivery and get 
paid. Borrowing money to pay for a purchase, and borrowing 
securities to settle a short sale, are “financing” transactions, 
which are usually done with repurchase agreements. 
Repurchase agreements are important to understanding the 
fails problem after September 11 because they can be used to 
avoid or cure settlement fails and because they themselves may 
fail to settle.
To borrow money with an RP, a dealer sells securities 
(typically for cash, or same-day, settlement) and 
simultaneously agrees to repurchase the same securities from 
the buyer at a higher price on a future date. As illustrated in 
Box 1, an RP is tantamount to a collateralized loan. The 
proceeds of the sale are the principal amount of the loan, and 
the excess of the repurchase price over the sale price is the 
interest paid on the loan.
The opposite occurs when a dealer has to borrow securities: 
the dealer buys (again, usually for cash settlement) the 
securities that it needs from an investor and simultaneously 
agrees to sell the same securities back to the investor at a higher 
price on a future date. This transaction is an RP from the 
investor’s perspective: a sale of securities today, coupled with 
an agreement to repurchase the securities on a future date. The 



















“reversing in” the securities that it needs against lending 
money, or borrowing securities using cash as collateral.
Corporate and municipal treasurers and money market 
mutual funds have money to lend for short periods of time and 
are important sources of funds for dealers. Other investors, 
such as pension funds and life insurance companies, own 
Treasury securities and are in a position to lend them to 
dealers. However, one might wonder why a pension fund or life 
insurance company would want to borrow a dealer’s money. 
The answer lies in the distinction between a general collateral 
RP and a special collateral RP.
General Collateral Repurchase Agreements
A general collateral repurchase agreement is an RP in which the 
lender of funds is willing to accept any of a variety of Treasury 
securities as collateral. The lender is concerned primarily with 
earning interest on its money and with having possession of 
securities that can be sold quickly in the event of a default by 
the borrower. Reflecting the relative indifference of the lender 
to the specific identity of the collateral, interest rates on general 
collateral RPs are commonly negotiated early in the business 
day—more than half of all general collateral RPs are negotiated 
before 9 a.m.—while collateral may not be assigned until late 
morning.
As shown in Chart 1, interest rates on overnight general 
collateral RPs are usually quite close to contemporaneous rates 
on overnight loans in the federal funds (fed funds) market. 
This comports with the essential character of a general 
collateral RP as a device for borrowing and lending money.
Special Collateral Repurchase Agreements
A special collateral repurchase agreement is an RP in which the 
lender of funds has identified a particular security as the only 
acceptable collateral. The rate on a special collateral RP is 
commonly called a “specials” rate. Each Treasury security has 
its own specials rate. This reflects the essential character of a 




On Monday, December 1, dealer A wants to finance 
$10 million principal amount of Treasury notes. The notes 
have a 5 percent coupon payable in semi-annual installments 
on May 15 and November 15 and are quoted at a price of 
99 percent of principal. Investor B agrees to lend the dealer 
money on an overnight repurchase agreement at a rate of 
3 percent per annum.
Assume for simplicity that the dealer sells the notes to the 
investor at the quoted price plus accrued interest for cash 
settlement on December 1. The accrued interest on the notes is 
computed using the 5 percent coupon rate and an actual-over-
actual-day count. There are 16 days from November 15 to 
December 1 and 182 days from November 15 to May 15 
(assuming the absence of a leap day), so the accrued interest to 
December 1 is:
accrued interest =  = .219780 percent 
of principal amount.
The amount borrowed, that is, the amount due upon delivery 
of the notes to investor B, is $9,921,978 ($9,921,978 = 
99.219780 percent of $10 million).
On Tuesday, December 2, dealer A repurchases the notes for 
the amount borrowed on December 1 plus interest on that 
amount at the rate of 3 percent per annum, calculated with an 
actual-over-360-day count:
repurchase amount = $9,921,978 +  percent
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Exhibit 1
Lending Collateral (and Borrowing Money) on a
Special Collateral Repurchase Agreement and

















The owner of a Treasury security that a dealer wants to 
borrow may not have any particular interest in borrowing the 
dealer’s money, but can nevertheless be induced to lend the 
security if it is offered an opportunity to borrow at a specials 
rate below where it can relend the same funds on a general 
collateral RP. For example, if the rate on a special collateral RP 
is 2 percent and the rate on a general collateral RP is 3 percent, 
then—as shown in Exhibit 1—an investor can earn a 100-basis- 
point spread by borrowing money on the special collateral RP 
and relending the money on a general collateral RP.
The Specials Rate for a Security 
and the “Specialness” of the Security
The difference between the general collateral RP rate and the 
specials rate for a security is a measure of the “specialness” of 
the security (Duffie 1996; Keane 1996; Jordan and Jordan 
1997). If the demand to borrow a security is modest relative to 
the supply of the security available for lending, a borrower of 
the security will usually be able to lend its money at a rate no 
lower than about 15 to 25 basis points below the general 
collateral rate. 
If the demand to borrow a security is strong, or if the supply 
of the security available for lending is limited, the specials rate 
for the security may be materially below the general collateral 
rate and the specialness spread correspondingly large. In this 
case, a dealer borrowing the security has to sacrifice a 
significant portion of the interest that it could have earned 
from lending its money in the general collateral market. 
Conversely, a holder of the security will be rewarded with a 
“bargain” loan rate. Charts 2 and 3 show specials rates for on-
the-run five- and ten-year notes, respectively, in 2001, and 
Table 1 shows average specialness spreads for these and other 
securities during the first eight months of 2001.8
In cases of exceptionally strong demand, or exceptionally 
limited supply, the specials rate for a security can be driven to 
zero or nearly zero. Charts 2 and 3 show several such instances, 
including the period from late January to early February for the 
five-year note and the period from late April to early May for 
the ten-year note. Other instances of extremely low specials 
rates have been documented by Cornell and Shapiro (1989), 
Jordan and Jordan (1997, pp. 2058-9), and Fleming (2000, 
pp. 229-31).
Supply, Demand, and Equilibrium in a Specials Market
The specialness spread for a security is the economic price of, 
or fee for, borrowing the security and fluctuates to balance the 
demand for borrowing with the supply available for lending. 
Ceteris paribus, a larger spread elicits greater supply because it 
offers a greater reward to owners of the security who borrow 
funds in the specials market (thereby lending the security) and 
relend the funds in the general collateral market.
A larger spread also reduces the demand for borrowing a 
security. Borrowing demand stems primarily from the need to 
finance short positions. Ceteris paribus, a larger specialness 
spread increases the cost of financing a short position and thus 
reduces the attractiveness of being short. Additionally, as the 
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Sources: Bloomberg; GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots overnight repurchase agreement (RP) rates for 
the on-the-run five-year U.S. Treasury note and general collateral 
from January 2 to December 31, 2001. “N” indicates the issuance 
of a new note and “R” indicates the reopening of an existing note.
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Sources: Bloomberg; GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots overnight repurchase agreement (RP) rates for 
the on-the-run ten-year U.S. Treasury note and general collateral 
from January 2 to December 31, 2001. “N” indicates the issuance 
of a new note and “R” indicates the reopening of an existing note.
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with short positions may begin to opt to fail on their delivery 
obligations rather than go to the trouble of lending money at a 
negligible rate of interest to borrow the securities needed to 
make delivery. This feature is critically important to under-
standing the fails problem following September 11 and will be 
examined later in more detail.
Settling a Repurchase Agreement
An RP involves two settlements: one at inception and the other 
at maturity. Following negotiation of the terms of an 
agreement, and usually on the same day, the lender of securities 
delivers the securities to its counterparty against payment of 
the principal amount of the RP. On the maturity date, the 
borrower of securities delivers the securities back to the 
original owner against payment of interest plus repayment 
of principal.
Comparing and Settling RPs between GSCC Members
If both parties to a bilaterally negotiated RP are GSCC 
members, the parties can submit their agreement to GSCC’s 
comparison and netting processes. Following negotiation of 
the terms of the RP, each party sends a message to GSCC 
identifying its counterparty and describing the terms. GSCC 
deems the agreement compared if it receives matching 
information from the two parties.
If the agreement calls for cash settlement of the starting leg, 
settlement of that leg is bilateral between the borrower and 
lender because GSCC does not net and novate transactions 
until after the close of business. If the agreement provides for 
settlement of the starting leg on a date following the trade date, 
settlement is included in GSCC’s netting and novation process 
for that date. In either case, settlement of the closing leg of the 
RP is included in GSCC’s netting and novation process.
Blind-Brokered RPs with Cash Settled Starting Legs
Inter-dealer brokers arrange RPs as well as outright trans-
actions. Prior to 1996, a broker would “give up” the name of 
each side of a brokered RP that provided for cash settlement of 
the starting leg to the counterparty and leave the two sides to 
settle the starting leg bilaterally. This arrangement had the 
disadvantage of allowing the lender of money on a general 
collateral RP to gain some insight into the long positions held 
by its counterparty, and of allowing the lender of securities on 
a special collateral RP to acquire information on a short 
position that its counterparty needed to finance.
In mid-1996, GSCC began to facilitate a less revealing way to 
settle the opening leg of a blind-brokered RP. Following 
negotiation of a blind-brokered RP, the borrower of money 
delivers the collateral securities to the broker against payment 
of the principal amount of the loan and the broker redelivers 
the securities (against the same payment) to the ultimate 
lender. GSCC makes this possible by guaranteeing broker 
payment and delivery obligations on compared transactions. 
(The broker’s role in cash settlement of the starting leg of a 
Table 1








Three-month bill 6.4 6.9 —  —
Six-month bill 5.4 3.2 —  —
Two-year note 107.8 101.7 82.2 92.4
Five-year note 142.2 156.2 18.5 20.0
Ten-year note 156.6 130.7 29.8 42.7
Thirty-year bond 7.9 6.9 8.0 8.4
Source: GovPX.
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics (in basis points) for the 
daily differences between the overnight general collateral rate and the 
specials rates on the indicated U.S. Treasury securities. A first-off-the-
run security is the most recently issued off-the-run security in a
particular series.42 Settlement Fails in the Treasury Market after 9/11
blind-brokered RP cannot be eliminated as long as GSCC does 
not net and novate transactions during a business day. This 
proved to be an important element of the fails problem 
following September 11.)
Borrowing Securities from 
the Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve’s System Open Market Account (SOMA) 
is the largest single owner of marketable Treasury securities, 
holding $575 billion in principal amount on December 31, 
2001, or 19.4 percent of the $2.968 trillion outstanding. The 
Federal Reserve allows primary dealers to borrow securities 
from SOMA as a “secondary and temporary source of 
securities . . . in order to promote smooth clearing of Treasury 
securities.”  9 Federal Reserve efforts to mitigate settlement 
problems after September 11 were carried out through this 
securities lending program.
The program works as follows. Each day at noon, the 
New York Fed auctions a specified amount of every Treasury 
security in the SOMA portfolio for overnight lending. (From 
September 7, 1999, through September 26, 2001, the amount 
was 45 percent of the quantity beneficially owned by SOMA, 
subject to an upper limit of the amount actually in SOMA’s 
account at the time of auction.) A participating dealer bids a 
borrowing fee that is economically equivalent to a specialness 
spread for each security that it wants to borrow. For example, a 
dealer might offer to pay a fee of 2 1/2 percent per annum to 
borrow a security if the general collateral rate is 4 percent and 
the specials rate for the security is 1 1/2 percent. Securities are 
awarded to the highest bidders at their bid rates until all bidders 
are satisfied or all of the available stock of a security has been 
allocated. Prior to September 11, a dealer had to bid a 
borrowing fee of at least 150 basis points and was limited to 
$100 million of any one security and $500 million in aggregate. 
Borrowings from SOMA are collateralized with other Treasury 
securities.
Chart 4 shows the volume of SOMA lending activity in 2001. 
Over the interval from January to August, primary dealers 
borrowed an average of $1.6 billion in principal amount of 
securities per day. On-the-run notes and bonds accounted for 
69.7 percent of the borrowings, off-the-run notes and bonds 
accounted for 25.2 percent, and the balance of 5.1 percent was 
in bills.
Settlement Fails
A settlement fail is the failure of a transaction to settle on 
the date originally agreed to by the buyer and seller. The 
transaction can be an outright sale, or the starting or closing leg 
of an RP. Although the post-September 11 period was 
characterized by an unprecedented level of fails, fails also occur 
















Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes: The chart plots daily lending of U.S. Treasury securities by the System Open Market Account (SOMA) of the Federal Reserve from January 2 
to December 31, 2001. Total lending is broken down by lending in bills, on-the-run coupon securities, and off-the-run coupon securities.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 43
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: The chart plots daily average settlement fails to deliver of
U.S. Treasury securities as reported by the primary dealers for the
weeks ending January 3 through December 26, 2001.
2001
Billions of U.S. dollars
in more normal times. During the first eight months of 2001, 
settlement fails in Treasury securities at primary dealers 
averaged $7.3 billion per day. Chart 5 shows the behavior of 
fails in 2001. 
Fails occur for a variety of reasons. One source of fails is 
miscommunication. Despite their best efforts to agree on 
terms, a buyer and seller may sometimes not identify to their 
respective operations departments the same details for a given 
transaction. On the settlement date, the seller may deliver what 
it believes is the correct quantity of the correct security and 
claim what it believes is the correct payment, but the buyer will 
reject the delivery and reclaim its funds if it has a different 
understanding of the transaction. If the rejection occurs late in 
the day, there may not be enough time for the parties to resolve 
the misunderstanding.
In some cases, a seller or a seller’s custodian may be unable 
to deliver securities because of operational problems. In an 
extreme example, a computer problem at BoNY on 
November 21, 1985, prevented the bank from issuing 
instructions to Fedwire to deliver securities from its custodial 
accounts. The bank was unable to resolve the problem until the 
following day. In the interim, it had to finance (at its own 
expense) the securities that it was unable to deliver. It borrowed 
in excess of $20 billion from the New York Fed and incurred 
interest expenses of about $5 million (Wall Street Journal 1985; 
Sender 1986).
Finally, and most commonly, a seller may be unable to 
deliver securities because of a failure to receive the same 
securities in settlement of an unrelated purchase. This can lead 
to a “daisy chain” of cumulatively additive fails: A’s failure to 
deliver bonds to B causes B to fail on a sale of the same bonds 
to C, causing C to fail on a similar sale to D, and so on. A daisy 
chain becomes a “round robin” if the last participant in the 
chain is itself failing to the first participant.
The Cost of a Fail
Market participants recognize that miscues and operational 
problems occur from time to time, and have adopted the 
convention of allowing a failing seller to make delivery the next 
business day at an unchanged invoice price (Public Securities 
Association 1993, Chapter 8, Section C).10 Settlement fails, 
however, are not costless.
The most important cost of a fail is that the seller loses the 
time value of the invoice price over the interval of the fail. (This 
cost may be reimbursed by the buyer if the buyer’s actions 
caused the fail, for example, by improperly rejecting securities 
properly tendered by the seller, or by a third party if the third 
party’s actions caused the fail, for example, a custodian failing 
to deliver securities pursuant to the instructions of the seller.) 
This implicit penalty (which can be quantified as the interest 
that could have been earned in the fed funds or general 
collateral markets) provides an incentive to sellers to avoid and 
cure fails. (There is an exactly offsetting benefit to a buyer that 
fails to receive securities and therefore does not have to pay for 
them as soon as originally scheduled: it can invest the invoice 
price until the securities arrive. Stigum [1988, pp. 181-5] and 
DeGennaro and Moser [1990] describe the relationship 
between fails and dealer behavior.)
Additionally, a fail exposes both the buyer and the seller to 
replacement cost risk. The buyer faces the risk that the seller 
becomes insolvent before settlement and that the price of the 
security increases prior to the seller’s insolvency. Conversely, 
Although the post-September 11 period 
was characterized by an unprecedented 
level of fails, fails also occur in more 
normal times. During the first eight 
months of 2001, settlement fails in 
Treasury securities at primary dealers 
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the seller faces the risk that the buyer becomes insolvent and that 
the price of the security declines prior to the buyer’s insolvency. 
The significance of replacement cost risk exposure may be small 
for a fail that does not last more than a few days, but it increases 
as a fail continues. Aged fails generally prompt market 
participants to step up their monitoring of counterparties. 
Initially, the increased monitoring may be nothing more
than a phone call to identify whether there has been a 
misunderstanding, but it can escalate to credit reviews and 
requests for ad hoc mark-to-market price adjustments.11 
Additionally, the net capital requirement for regulated brokers 
and dealers adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
assesses capital charges for two types of aged fails (17 CFR 
240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(E) and 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(ix)).
Avoiding and Curing Fails
Market participants have adopted a variety of techniques to 
avoid fails attributable to miscommunication and to avoid and 
cure fails attributable to a failure to receive securities that are to 
be redelivered. Most importantly, GSCC’s comparison process 
limits fails attributable to miscommunication, and its netting 
and novation process limits daisy chain and round robin fails 
among its members. For example, if member A sells 
$25 million of bonds to member B, B sells $25 million of the 
same bonds to member C, and C sells $25 million of the bonds 
to member D, then, after netting and novation, A owes 
$25 million of the bonds to GSCC and GSCC owes $25 million 
of the bonds to D. If A fails to GSCC (and GSCC consequently 
fails to D), the aggregate fails to deliver and receive will be 
limited to $50 million each. In the absence of netting and 
novation, A’s failure to deliver could result in aggregate fails to 
deliver and receive of $75 million each.
GSCC’s net settlement process does not completely eliminate 
round robin fails, because GSCC fails are not usually renetted 
every day.12 A GSCC member that fails to deliver securities 
pursuant to a GSCC instruction must ultimately make that 
specific delivery, even if the member is a net buyer of an equal or 
larger amount of the same issue for settlement on the next 
business day. Similarly, GSCC remains obligated to redeliver the 
securities pursuant to its matched and bound redelivery 
instruction, even if the member to whom GSCC owes the 
securities is a net seller of an equal or larger amount of the same 
issue for settlement on the next business day. Thus, it is possible 
for a GSCC member to be failing to GSCC and for GSCC to be 
failing simultaneously to the same member in the same security 
on a delivery instruction created on a different date.
As shown in Exhibit 2, fails stemming from an inability to 
deliver securities because of a failure to receive the same 
securities can be cured (or avoided entirely) by reversing in the 
securities needed for delivery and delivering the borrowed 
securities. The reverse RP can be closed out when the seller 
finally makes delivery. A market participant with offsetting fails 
is usually better off earning the specials rate on the money it 
lends out against reversing in the securities needed to make 
delivery, even if that rate is below the general collateral rate. 
The alternative to reversing in securities is to fail and forgo 
interest altogether on the sale proceeds.
When Fails Can Become Chronic
The incentive of a seller to borrow securities to avoid or cure a 
fail declines with the specials rate for the security. When the 
specials rate is near zero, a seller has little to gain lending money 
(at nearly no interest) to borrow the needed securities.13 This 
suggests that market participants may have little incentive to 
break daisy chains and round robins when the specials rate for 
a security is near zero. This aspect of the market is important to 
understanding the fails problem after September 11.
A specials rate near zero becomes increasingly likely when 
there is strong demand for borrowing a security. As noted, 
demand for a security will be strong when there is substantial 
short interest in the security (due to hedging requirements or 
Market participants have adopted a variety 
of techniques to avoid fails attributable to 
miscommunication and to avoid and cure 
fails attributable to a failure to receive 
securities that are to be redelivered.
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The significance of replacement cost risk 
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Suppose investor A sells bonds to dealer B, who then resells the
bonds to investor C. The delivery and payment obligations of A, B, and





Assume that A fails to deliver the bonds to B, causing B to fail to C.
To cure its fail to C, B can reverse in the bonds from investor D and
deliver the borrowed bonds. Actual movements of bonds and funds
are shown with solid lines. The continuing (unfulfilled) obligations of A















When A finally delivers the bonds to B, B can terminate its reverse
repurchase agreement (RP) with D.
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expectations of interest rate changes). In addition, such short 
interest is usually concentrated in highly liquid on-the-run 
issues. This suggests why specials rates for on-the-run five- and 
ten-year notes fall (Charts 2 and 3) and fails rise (Chart 5) 
around mid-quarter refunding auctions, a time when market 
participants are actively engaged in taking positions based on 
their assessments of the relative values of different securities 
and the prospect for change in the level and shape of the yield 
curve (Garbade 1996, Chapter 8).
Additionally, the specials rate for a security will be driven to 
its lower limit more frequently when the fed funds rate, and 
hence the general collateral rate, is lower. This follows because 
the gross compensation earned by a lender of securities at any 
given specials rate is the difference between the general 
collateral rate and the specials rate. A lower general collateral 
rate rations marginal lenders of securities out of the specials 
market and reduces the quantity of securities available for 
lending at a given specials rate. This leads to a lower 
equilibrium specials rate and hence to a more common 
occurrence of the specials rate driven to nearly zero.
Settlement Fails Following 
September 11
The attacks of September 11 precipitated an extraordinary 
increase in settlement fails in the Treasury securities market. As 
shown in Chart 5, daily average fails jumped from $1.7 billion 
during the week ending Wednesday, September 5, to 
$190 billion during the week ending September 19. (Our fails 
data begin in mid-1994. The previous high-water mark had 
been $35 billion during the week ending May 16, 2001.) The 
Federal Reserve responded by relaxing restrictions on its 
securities lending program. When the volume of fails did not 
abate after three weeks and when fails began to threaten, 
according to Treasury, “the price discovery process and the 
smooth operating of the Treasury market” (New York Times 
2001), Treasury reopened the on-the-run ten-year note.
Initial Events
American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the 
World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. on Tuesday, September 11. 
United Airlines Flight 175 hit the south tower sixteen minutes 
later, and both towers collapsed before 10:30 a.m. The 
catastrophe destroyed the offices and business records of 
several inter-dealer brokers and damaged the facilities of 
Verizon Corporation, located immediately north of the north 
tower, thereby impairing telecommunication services 
throughout Lower Manhattan.
Destruction of Broker Offices and Records
Although trading stopped soon after the first attack, purchases 
and sales of about $80 billion of Treasury and related securities, 
and about $500 billion in repurchase agreements, had already 
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transactions had been arranged by brokers, several of which 
were located in the towers of the World Trade Center. Those 
that did not submit trade data on a real-time basis had not yet 
advised GSCC of the terms of many of the transactions, and 
they had not yet given their clearing banks instructions for 
redelivering securities received in settlement of the starting legs 
of many of the RPs. This led to two significant operational 
problems.
First, the starting legs of numerous blind-brokered RPs 
failed to settle. Under normal conditions, if dealer A financed, 
through broker B, a purchase or repurchase of $10 million of 
bonds with dealer C, dealer A would send the bonds to B’s 
clearing bank and the broker would instruct its bank to 
redeliver the bonds to dealer C. (Both of these deliveries would 
be against payment of the principal amount of the RP.) On 
September 11, however, the clearing banks never received 
redelivery instructions for many RPs and the securities either 
remained in the brokers’ clearing accounts or were returned to 
the putative borrowers.
Second, GSCC could not compare numerous brokered 
transactions because it was missing the brokers’ advisory 
messages. Uncompared transactions were liable to be excluded 
from the netting and novation process scheduled for the 
evening of September 11 and thrown back on GSCC’s 
members to resolve as best they could. Resolution would, 
however, be extraordinarily difficult because the buyers and 
sellers did not know the identities of their ultimate counter-
parties and because the offices and records of some of the 
brokers had been destroyed.
Impaired Telecommunication Links
Damage to telecommunication facilities impaired connectivity 
between many market participants and affected BoNY 
especially severely (MacRae 2001; Wall Street Journal 2001a, d; 
Bond Market Association 2001). Several brokers whose offices 
were not destroyed were nevertheless unable to advise GSCC of 
trades they had arranged on the morning of September 11. 
Moreover, GSCC and several dealers could not verify what 
came into and what left their custodial accounts at BoNY, they 
could not advise BoNY of securities they expected to receive, 
and they could not give BoNY instructions for delivering 
securities. Additionally, GSCC was unable to verify the 
movement of funds into and out of its account at BoNY
(GSCC Important Notice GSCC068.01).
GSCC Initiatives
GSCC took two actions on the night of September 11 to 
minimize the problems caused by the destruction of broker 
records and by the loss of telecommunication links (GSCC 
Important Notice GSCC070.01). First, it created, as best it 
could from the dealer messages that it had received, the missing 
broker messages on more than 2,000 trades valued at more 
than $70 billion.14 This action brought the trades into GSCC’s 
netting and novation process and centralized the reconciliation 
of transactions that might have otherwise proved 
irreconcilable. Second, GSCC assumed responsibility for 
starting-leg fails on almost $100 billion of blind-brokered RPs, 
even though it had not been able to compare many of the 
agreements with the brokers and their counterparties.
Consequences for Settlement Fails
GSCC classifies as a fail any delivery instruction for which it 
does not receive a report of good delivery (GSCC Important 
Notice GSCC074.01). In the absence of complete information 
on deliveries into and out of its account at BoNY on 
September 11, and as a result of its assumption of settlement 
fails on the starting legs of blind-brokered RPs, GSCC recorded 
(after the close of business on September 11) $266 billion in 
transactions that apparently failed to settle.15
After the close of business, GSCC followed its normal 
practice and paired off starting-leg fails on overnight RPs with 
the closing legs of the same agreements and canceled both 
legs.16 (It marked its remaining fails to market and created new 
delivery instructions for those fails.17) Also after the close of 
business on September 11, GSCC netted member transactions 
scheduled to settle on September 12 (including the brokered 
transactions for regular settlement for which it had created 
missing broker messages), novated the net purchase or sale 
obligations of each of its members, and created delivery 
instructions for the novated obligations.
Continuing connectivity problems prevented GSCC from 
giving BoNY delivery instructions after the close of business on 
September 11 and prevented it from acquiring information on 
activity in its account at BoNY during the day on September 12. 
Consequently, GSCC recorded $440 billion in settlement fails 
as of the close of business on September 12.
Although trading stopped soon after the 
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As market participants gradually reacquired connectivity in 
succeeding days, they began to reconcile their incomplete and 
erroneous trade and settlement information. Settlement fails at 
GSCC dropped to $403 billion on September 13, to $225 billion 
on September 14, and to about $90 billion by the end of the 
following week.
Initial Federal Reserve Actions
The Federal Reserve reacted promptly to the September 11 
attacks. The best-known dimensions of the response are the 
expansion of discount window loans and RPs with primary 
dealers that ensured bank liquidity and the integrity of the 
payments system (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2002; 
McAndrews and Potter 2002). On the securities side, 
the New York Fed acted to make Treasury collateral more 
readily available to primary dealers. On September 11, it 
suspended the $500 million limit on borrowings of SOMA 
securities by a single dealer, as well as the issue limit of 
$100 million for a single dealer. (The post-September 11 
changes to the securities lending program are posted at 
<http:// www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/news/opnmktops/
2001/omo010911.html>.) As shown in Chart 4, securities 
borrowings increased from $100 million on September 10 
to $8.9 billion on September 11 and then declined gradually 
in the following days, to $7.8 billion on September 12, 
$5.6 billion on September 13, and steadily lower amounts 
the following week.
Persistence of Settlement Fails
Despite painstaking efforts by market participants to reconcile 
their transactions, and despite the expanded volume of 
securities borrowings from the System Open Market Account, 
settlement fails in the Treasury market did not abate quickly to 
pre-attack levels. As shown in Chart 5, primary dealers 
reported daily average fails of $190 billion for the week ending 
September 19, $105 billion for the week ending September 26, 
and $142 billion for the week ending October 3.
The persistence of high levels of fails can be most 
immediately attributed to specials rates at or close to zero in the 
weeks following September 11 (Charts 2 and 3). With specials 
rates so low, market participants had limited incentive to 
reverse in securities to break the daisy chains and round robins 
that had appeared during the chaos of September 11 and the 
days immediately following. Additionally, the low specials rates 
may have given some market participants an incentive to fail 
“strategically,” or to agree to lend securities on special collateral 
RPs and then to fail intentionally on the starting legs of the 
agreements (Box 2).
Specials rates were driven down to negligible levels by 
contractions in the supply schedules of securities available for 
lending. This resulted in part from the reduction in the target 
fed funds rate from 3 1/2 percent to 3 percent on Monday, 
September 17. The action reduced the gross economic return 
to lending Treasury securities at any given specials rate and 




When the specials rate for a security is close to zero, a market 
participant with no position in the security may sometimes 
lend the security on a term repurchase agreement (RP) and 
then fail intentionally on the RP’s starting leg. 
Suppose, for example, the three-week specials rate for a 
five-year note is 10 basis points and that XYZ Co. believes the 
two-week specials rate will be 50 basis points in one week. If 
XYZ contracts (in the specials market) to borrow $50 million 
for three weeks against lending the note, it will owe interest 
of $2,916.67 at the end of three weeks ($2,916.67 = 
(21/360) .0010 $50,000,000). It will owe this amount even if 
it fails to deliver the note during the entire three-week interval. 
XYZ Co. has effectively purchased an implicit option (for 
$2,916.67, payable in three weeks) on an exchange of 
$50 million for the five-year note at any time during the next 
three weeks for the balance of the three-week interval.
XYZ Co. could choose to let its implicit option expire 
unexercised and simply pay the $2,916.67 premium at the end 
of three weeks. However, if XYZ Co.’s expectations prove 
correct, it can exercise the option after one week by reversing in 
the five-year note for two weeks against lending $50 million at 
50 basis points (earning interest of $9,722.22) and delivering 
the note in (delayed) settlement of its earlier negotiated three-
week RP ($9,722.22 = (14/360) .0050 $50,000,000). The 
$50 million received from delivering the note funds the loan 
that allows XYZ Co. to reverse in the note, and XYZ Co. has net 
interest earnings of $6,805.55 ($6,805.55 = $9,722.22 interest 
income less $2,916.67 interest expense). More generally, a very 
low specials rate presents an opportunity to speculate on an 
increase in the rate—by lending on an RP with the intention of 
failing at least initially—with limited downside exposure.
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The supply schedules of securities available for lending 
also contracted as a result of a prospective increase in the 
operational costs of lending. After outright trading in Treasury 
securities reopened on Thursday, September 13, market 
participants became aware of the substantial volume of fails 
precipitated by the events of September 11. They realized that 
if they lent Treasury securities on RPs, they might not receive 
their securities back promptly at the end of the agreements. 
This would leave them exposed to the risk of counterparty 
failure and necessitate the allocation of scarce resources to 
monitor and control that risk. (The withdrawal of some 
institutional lenders from the specials markets after 
September 11 was widely noted. See, for example, Dow Jones 
Newswire [2001a, b], Bloomberg [2001b, in which Peter Fisher, 
Treasury’s Under Secretary for Domestic Finance, remarked 
on the “reluctance by institutional investors to lend into a 
market that is suffering from extraordinarily high fails levels”], 
Wall Street Journal [2001b], New York Times [2001], and 
Washington Post [2001].)
Some market observers also suggested that a nontrivial 
quantity of Treasury securities may have been acquired in a 
“flight to quality” after the attacks by investors who normally 
invested in other types of securities and who were not prepared 
to lend the Treasury securities that they acquired (Bloomberg 
2001a; Wall Street Journal 2001c). Any such migration of 
ownership would have further reduced the supply of securities 
available for lending at any given specials rate.
Comment
The inverse relationship between settlement fails and the 
quantity of securities available for lending at a given specials 
rate suggests that there may be multiple equilibria in the 
specials markets. The surge in fails on and immediately after 
September 11 may have moved the market to a new 
equilibrium characterized by higher levels of fails, lower levels 
of securities lending at any given specials rates, and lower 
equilibrium specials rates. Market participants were not 
ignorant of the possibility that the specials markets may have 
arrived at a new equilibrium in late September. A broker was 
quoted as wondering whether “desks aren’t lending because 
they’re scared [trades] won’t settle,” or whether “trades won’t 
settle because nobody is lending?” (Dow Jones Newswire 
2001a). Under Secretary Fisher later described the relationship 
between fails and reluctance to lend as “self-compounding” 
(New York Times 2001).
Subsequent Federal Reserve 
and Treasury Actions
The persistence of settlement fails in late September led the 
New York Fed to continue to relax restrictions on the SOMA 
securities lending program. On September 18, it reduced the 
minimum fee for borrowing securities from 150 basis points to 
100 basis points, and on September 27, it increased the amount 
of a security that it was prepared to lend to 75 percent of the 
amount owned. As shown in Chart 4, the higher lending limit 
led to a sharp increase in aggregate borrowings, from $6.4 billion 
on September 26 to $13.4 billion on September 27. Nevertheless, 
specials rates for the on-the-run five- and ten-year notes 
remained close to zero and, as noted above, the volume of fails 
remained unusually high, averaging $142 billion per day for the 
week ending October 3.
Reopening the Ten-Year Note
At 11 a.m. on Thursday, October 4, the Treasury took the 
unprecedented step of announcing that it would sell, at 
1 p.m. that day, an additional $6 billion of the on-the-run 
ten-year note (the 5 percent note maturing August 15, 2011), 
thereby increasing the outstanding supply of the note to 
$18 billion. This was the first unscheduled snap auction of a 
coupon-bearing security since the regularization of note and 
bond auctions in the late 1970s and early 1980s.18 The new 
securities were issued shortly after 9 a.m. the following 
morning.
The immediate reason for Treasury’s unusual response to 
market conditions was a desire to reduce the volume of fails; 
Treasury attributed the decision to the “chronically high fails 
rate” (Bloomberg 2001a). More fundamentally, officials had 
become concerned that fails might begin to affect the 
performance and efficiency of the market. Under Secretary 
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Fisher stated that “we want to reduce the risk that these 
settlement problems turn into a much bigger problem for the 
Treasury market” and that “we wanted to prevent technical 
problems in the back office from causing wider problems in the 
pricing of government securities” (New York Times 2001; 
Washington Post 2001).
The additional ten-year notes, and the prospect that 
Treasury might also reopen the on-the-run five-year note,19 
appear to have had the intended effect. As shown in Chart 5, 
daily average fails fell from $142 billion during the week ending 
October 3 to $63 billion the next week and then to about 
$18 billion in each of the following two weeks. The specials rate 
for the ten-year note jumped to 90 basis points on October 5 
and continued to rise to 173 basis points on October 12. The 
specials rate for the five-year note rose more modestly, but 
reached 40 basis points by October 12. As shown in Chart 4, 
aggregate borrowings of securities from SOMA also declined 
after the reopening.
Comment
The impact of the reopening on the specials rate for the five-
year note and on the general level of settlement fails is 
consistent with the idea that there may be multiple equilibria in 
the specials markets. In particular, the highly unusual and 
widely publicized Treasury action may have moved the market 
back toward an equilibrium characterized by a lower level of 
fails, a higher volume of securities lending at any given specials 
rate, and higher equilibrium specials rates. Market participants 
may have come to the conclusion that Treasury would take 
unprecedented steps to resolve the fails problem and that there 
was less reason to continue to hold back on lending securities 
out of concern that the securities might not be returned 
promptly.
Alleviating Chronic Fails
Settlement fails can become widespread and persistent when 
specials rates are near zero, as we discussed. Demand to borrow 
securities may substantially exceed lending supply at a specials 
rate just above zero, but the option to fail precludes an 
equilibrium rate below zero. Initiatives to alleviate chronic fails 
must therefore either increase an issue’s lendable supply when 
specials rates approach zero or increase the cost of a fail and 
allow specials rates to go below zero.
Reopening Issues on an Unscheduled Basis
One way to alleviate chronic fails in an issue is to increase the 
issue’s outstanding supply. Treasury adopted this approach 
when it reopened the ten-year note in October 2001. The 
reopening increased the lendable supply of the note, causing 
the specials rate on the issue to rise and making borrowing the 
note more attractive than failing.
Although the reopening seemed effective at resolving fails in 
the ten-year note (as well as in other issues), ad hoc reopenings 
have drawbacks. Above all, such reopenings do not necessarily 
meet Treasury’s financing needs. As noted, Treasury indicated 
that the reopening of the ten-year note had “nothing to do with 
an increase of funding needs on our part.” Financing the 
federal government is, of course, the purpose of debt issuance 
in the first place. Selling securities to enhance market efficiency 
could be seen as a matter of the tail wagging the dog.
Unscheduled reopenings also disrupt Treasury issuance 
patterns, both with respect to the reopening itself and with 
respect to any subsequent disruptions resulting from the 
additional funds. Since the early 1980s, Treasury has 
maintained a regular and predictable schedule of note and 
bond auctions (Fisher 2002b). Predictable offerings are 
believed to help minimize Treasury borrowing costs by 
reducing uncertainty among market participants.
Perhaps because of these drawbacks, Treasury has indicated 
that unscheduled reopenings are unlikely to become a 
prominent debt management tool. In early 2002, Under 
Secretary Fisher said, “never is a long time, so it would be 
imprudent of me to say that the Treasury will never again hold 
such an auction. But you should not count on it. . . . We want 
to rely on [market participants] to reconcile the forces of 
supply and demand” (Fisher 2002a).
At 11 a.m. on Thursday, October 4, the 
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announcing that it would sell, at 1 p.m. 
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Notes: The chart plots daily lending of the on-the-run five-year U.S. Treasury note by the System Open Market Account (SOMA) of the Federal Reserve
against SOMA securities lending limits and ownership from January 2 to December 31, 2001. The shading indicates the lending limit.
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Expanding Federal Reserve 
Securities Lending
Another way to alleviate chronic fails is to foster lending by 
large owners. Treasury securities owned by the Federal 
Reserve’s System Open Market Account are in fact made 
available for overnight borrowing, as we discussed. However, 
the ability of SOMA lending to mitigate settlement problems is 
constrained by limits on the quantities of securities available 
for lending. As shown in Charts 6 and 7, such limits were 
binding on fifty trading days in 2001 for the on-the-run five-
year note and on seventy-nine days for the ten-year note. 
(We classify the lending limit as binding when the amount 
borrowed is within 1 percent of the limit.)
The temporary relaxation of program rules on 
September 27 that made 75 percent of SOMA holdings 
available for lending allowed securities borrowing to expand.20 
Nonetheless, even the higher limit was sometimes binding and 
it was unable to move specials rates much above zero for some 
securities. SOMA lending is ultimately constrained by SOMA 
ownership. In September 2001, SOMA owned only $1 billion 
of the $12 billion on-the-run ten-year note.21 The temporary 
increase of the SOMA lending limit from 45 percent to 
75 percent thus allowed for additional lending of only 
$300 million of that issue.
Introducing Treasury Securities Lending
As Treasury has the ability to create new securities, it could 
alleviate chronic fails by introducing a securities lending facility 
of its own. Such a facility was recommended by the Treasury 
Advisory Committee in the aftermath of September 11 
(Bloomberg 2001c). The facility would enable market 
participants to borrow specific issues on a temporary basis, 
thereby expanding the supply of a security when it is in 
particularly high demand without permanently increasing its 
supply. As with the SOMA program, Treasury could require 
that any borrowed securities be collateralized with other 
Treasury securities.
In contrast to the SOMA program, a Treasury facility need 
not set limits on the quantity of securities it lends out. Treasury 
might instead want to specify the fee at which securities can
be borrowed and then fill all applications at that fee. An 
appropriate fee might be one that was just below the general 
collateral rate, such as the general collateral rate less 10 basis 
points. With borrowing collateralized by other Treasury 
securities, such a fee would be equivalent to Treasury lending 
securities (and borrowing money) at a specials rate of 10 basis 
points and then relending the money (and borrowing other 
securities) at the general collateral rate. The fee would 
introduce a near infinite elasticity of supply of securities at a 
specials rate just above zero, but make borrowing securities 
from Treasury unattractive as long as specials rates were greater 
than 10 basis points.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 51
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes: The chart plots daily lending of the on-the-run ten-year U.S. Treasury note by the System Open Market Account (SOMA) of the Federal Reserve
against SOMA securities lending limits and ownership from January 2 to December 31, 2001. The shading indicates the lending limit.
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A fee marginally less than the general collateral rate would 
preserve the incentive to borrow an issue rather than fail 
without affecting the normal functioning of the specials 
market. Market participants would have an incentive to 
borrow a security from Treasury only when the specials rate 
dropped below 10 basis points, so issue specialness would likely 
be only minimally affected.22 To the extent that issue special-
ness did not decrease, Treasury borrowing costs would not be 
adversely affected.23 In fact, the mitigation of settlement 
problems could enhance market liquidity and efficiency, 
leading to lower Treasury borrowing costs.
In addition to the SOMA program, there is precedent for a 
Treasury securities lending facility from other debt issuers, as 
described below. Table 2 compares key features of the various 
lending facilities.
United Kingdom Debt Management Office RP Facilities
The United Kingdom Debt Management Office has had a 
“special” RP facility available for several years. The facility 
allows the office, at its sole discretion, to create and repo out 
gilts to “dissuade manipulation” of specific issues and to 
“address instances of market disruption or dislocation when a 
particular stock is temporarily in extremely short supply” 
(United Kingdom Debt Management Office 1999). Such 
operations would likely allow market makers to borrow specific 
issues overnight against lending money at a zero percent rate, 
while simultaneously requiring them to borrow funds against 
general collateral at the Bank of England’s RP rate (to offset the 
cash flow implications of the special RP).24 The special RP 
facility has never been utilized, although it was made available 
on one occasion (Bank of England 1998).
The Debt Management Office introduced a nondiscre-
tionary standing RP facility in June 2000 that provides for the 
creation and lending of any issue on demand and that largely 
supersedes the special RP facility (United Kingdom Debt 
Management Office 2000). The facility is available to market 
makers willing to lend money at a rate equal to 10 percent of 
the Bank of England’s RP rate against borrowing a specific 
issue, and requires that they simultaneously borrow money 
(against general collateral) at the bank’s RP rate. A market 
maker thus effectively pays a fee equal to 90 percent of the 
bank’s RP rate to borrow a specific issue, while providing 
generic securities as collateral. The facility was first used on 
December 29, 2000, and has been used several times since 
(United Kingdom Debt Management Office 2001, p. 35).
Fannie Mae RP Facility
In the United States, the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (Fannie Mae), a government-sponsored enterprise, 
introduced an RP lending facility in October 2001. The facility 
is intended to enhance the liquidity and trading activity of 
Fannie Mae’s securities in the cash and collateral markets “by 
reducing the possibility of fails and providing collateral when 
there is limited lendable supply” (Fannie Mae 2001, p. 1).52 Settlement Fails in the Treasury Market after 9/11
The program works as follows. Fannie Mae issues to its own 
account an additional 25 percent of each new “benchmark” 
issue brought to market. (Fannie Mae’s benchmark securities 
are issued in large sizes, on a regular basis, and across a range of 
maturities.) Fannie Mae then lends out, on a daily basis, up to 
60 percent of the amount of any security held in its own 
account. For example, if Fannie Mae brings a $5 billion issue to 
market, it retains an additional $1.25 billion of the issue, and 
makes up to $750 million of the issue available for lending on 
any single day. The RPs bring in funds for Fannie Mae, which 
it presumably relends in the general collateral market or uses in 
lieu of borrowings from other sources.
The amount lent out and corresponding rate are deter-
mined through a multiple price auction, with the highest 
acceptable bid rate based on the level of market rates. In 
December 2001, for example, the highest acceptable bid rate 
was set at the general collateral rate less 1.00 percent. (If the 
general collateral rate were 1.75 percent, such a requirement 
called for dealers to bid 0.75 percent or less.) Fannie Mae’s RP 
facility was first used on November 26, 2001, and has been used 
numerous times since (Fannie Mae 2001, p. 2).
Instituting a Penalty Fee for Fails
Chronic fails can also be alleviated by increasing the cost of 
failing with a penalty fee. The penalty would give sellers an 
economic incentive to borrow securities, even at specials rates 
below zero, in order to make delivery. Specials rates below zero 
would also draw lenders into the market that might otherwise 
be unwilling to lend (because of inadequate compensation or 
because of concern that their securities might not be returned 
promptly) and would curtail borrowing demand arising out of 
short sales. Provision for market clearing specials rates below 
zero would also bring the Treasury market into line with U.S. 
equity markets, where stock loan rates can, and do, go below 
zero (D’Avolio forthcoming), and would be consistent with 
Under Secretary Fisher’s intention “to rely on . . . the forces of 
supply and demand.”
The penalty fee could possibly be instituted through good- 
practice recommendations of the Bond Market Association. 
Failed deliveries would be rescheduled for the next business day 
at a slightly lower invoice price (under certain circumstances), 
as opposed to an unchanged invoice price (the current 
practice). The operational burden of changing an invoice price 
following a delay in settlement would undoubtedly be 
substantial, but the burden could be limited by restricting the 
penalty to aged fails, such as those outstanding a week or more. 
Restricting the penalty to aged fails would also avoid penalizing 
fails arising from operational problems or miscommunication, 
which tend to get resolved quickly in any event.
 The penalty fee could be set high enough so that failing is 
rarely an attractive option, but not so high as to unduly punish 
fails attributable to operational problems and/or lead to 
Table 2
Comparison of Securities Lending Facilities
Category










Introduced April 1999a June 2000 October 2001 Proposed
Offering process Daily auction Fixed price offering Daily auction Fixed price offering
Fee/rate Minimum fee of 100 bp Fixed fee of 90 percent of the 
Bank of England’s RP rateb
Maximum rate
of GC-100 bpc
Fixed fee such as GC-10 bp
Collateral Other securities Other securities Cash Other securities
Lending limit 45 percent of holdings None 60 percent of holdings None
Term Overnight Overnight Overnight Overnight
Sources: Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); Federal Reserve Bank of New York; United Kingdom Debt Management Office.
Note: Information for the three existing facilities is as of December 31, 2001.
aThe program was implemented in its current form at this time but was first established in 1969.
bThis is the implicit fee; the facility provides for securities lending at 10 percent of the Bank of England’s repurchase agreement (RP) rate while requiring 
market makers to put up general collateral (GC) at the bank’s RP rate against the issues being lent.
cSuch a requirement is roughly equivalent to a minimum 100-basis-point (bp) fee in the other programs.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 53
protracted conflict between buyers and sellers over the specific 
causes of fails. For example, suppose the penalty fee were set at 
a rate of 5 percent per annum minus the general collateral rate, 
with a minimum of zero. The fee would then be implemented 
only at general collateral rates of less than 5 percent and only to 
bring the total cost of failing to 5 percent. If the general 
collateral rate were 3 percent, for example, the penalty fee 
would be 2 percent. Failure to deliver in such circumstances 
would result in settlement being rescheduled for the next 
business day, with the invoice price reduced at the annualized 
penalty rate of 2 percent. The failing party would incur an 
explicit cost of failing of 2 percent per annum in addition to 
the implicit cost of 3 percent per annum due to the delayed 
receipt of funds. Failing would not be an attractive option as 
long as the specialness spread on a security was less than 
5p e r c e n t .
Conclusion
The attacks of September 11 destroyed the offices of several 
inter-dealer brokers in the Treasury securities market, 
impaired telecommunication services in and through Lower 
Manhattan, and precipitated an extraordinary volume of 
settlement fails in Treasury securities. The Federal Reserve 
responded by relaxing restrictions on its securities lending 
program, thereby making Treasury collateral more readily 
available. As connectivity was gradually restored, market 
participants began reconciling incomplete and erroneous trade 
information, and the volume of fails started to decline.
Despite painstaking efforts by market participants to 
reconcile their transactions, however, and despite an expanded 
volume of securities borrowings from SOMA, settlement fails 
did not abate quickly to pre-attack levels. The persistence of 
high levels of fails can be most immediately attributed to 
specials rates at or close to zero in the days and weeks following 
September 11. Specials rates were driven down by a contraction 
in lending associated with a lower fed funds rate and as a result 
of a prospective increase in the operational costs of lending. 
With specials rates so low, a fail was not an unattractive 
alternative to borrowing securities to make delivery.
The persistence of settlement fails ultimately led the 
Treasury to announce an unprecedented snap reopening of the 
on-the-run ten-year note. The reopening increased the note’s 
specials rate and aggregate fails quickly declined. However, 
such reopenings are unlikely to become a recurrent debt 
management tool. Alternative, less disruptive, ways of 
alleviating chronic fails include the introduction of a securities 
lending facility run by Treasury and the institution of a penalty 
fee for fails.Endnotes
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1. Bank for International Settlements (2001) offers an excellent 
glossary of many of the terms that appear in this article.
2. The criteria are described at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/
bankinfo/regrept/primary.html>. The primary dealers are listed at 
<http://www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/news/opnmktops/2002/
an020401.html>.
3. There is some double counting in the figures, especially for 
brokered trading, as trades between primary dealers are reported by 
both parties. Trading volume statistics are posted at
<http://www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/statistics/>.
4. JPMorgan Chase Bank resulted from the merger of the Chase 
Manhattan Bank and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York 
on November 10, 2001. Clearing bank services were provided by the 
Chase Manhattan Bank prior to the merger. For expositional clarity, 
we refer to JPMC even when speaking of events prior to the merger.
5. The Federal Reserve limits a single Fedwire transfer to no more than 
$50 million (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2002, 
Section 10.2). The market practice of delivering larger sales in multiple 
separate blocks of $50 million (plus a tail piece, if required) is based 
on the delivery guidelines of the Bond Market Association (Public 
Securities Association 1993, Chapter 7, Section A.4.b).
6. Membership requirements are described in the GSCC Overview 
and the GSCC Rulebook, both of which are posted at
<http://www.gscc.com/important_notices_frame.html>
under Other Important Documents. Membership is posted at
<http://www.gscc.com/participants_frame.html>.
7. This net obligation also includes forward settling trades executed 
on preceding days and scheduled to settle on the following business 
day and (as described in the next section) closing legs of repurchase 
agreements terminating on the following business day. It does not 
include trades executed earlier in the same day for cash settlement. 
Cash settlement trades are settled bilaterally during the business day, 
even if both the buyer and the seller are GSCC members, because 
GSCC does not assess net receive and deliver obligations until after the 
close of business.
8. In the collateral markets, a security is on the run if it is the most 
recently issued security in a particular series (as opposed to the most 
recently auctioned security), because securities lending cannot take 
place until a security has been issued.
9. In “Announcement of Revisions to the SOMA Securities Lending 
Program,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 12, 1999, 
posted at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/news/announce/
1999>. Details on the securities lending program as it existed prior to 
September 11 also appear in announcements dated April 20, 
August 26, and September 7, 1999.
10. However, the Master Repurchase Agreement suggested by the 
Bond Market Association (posted at <http://www.bondmarkets.com/
market/agreements.shtml>) provides, inter alia, that the lender of 
money on an RP may, at its option, declare an event of default 
following a failure by the borrower of money to deliver securities on 
the starting leg of the RP, and that the borrower of money may, at its 
option, declare an event of default following a failure by the lender
of money to deliver securities on the closing leg of the RP (see 
paragraph 11 of the agreement). Outright transactions do not usually 
have comparable express default provisions, but a buyer may specify 
at the time a transaction is negotiated that it needs “guaranteed 
delivery.”
11. GSCC marks fails to market every day and thereby eliminates the 
replacement cost risk of a continuing fail. The invoice price specified 
in an instruction to deliver a security to GSCC is revised to the 
contemporaneous current market value of the security each day that a 
member continues to fail to deliver the security. The change in invoice 
price is offset with a cash payment called a “fail mark.” If the CMV 
increases, the member has to make a payment equal to the product of 
the increase in the CMV and the quantity of securities to be delivered. 
(The member recovers this payment when it delivers the security at the 
revised, higher CMV.) Conversely, if the CMV declines, the member 
will receive a cash payment. At the same time, GSCC marks to market 
its own fail to the member that was issued the matched and bound 
redelivery instruction.
12. See GSCC Rulebook, Rule 12, Section 4 (January 10, 2002). 
However, GSCC does have the right, at its sole discretion, to renet and 
pair off fails. See GSCC Rulebook, Rule 11, Section 8 (January 10, 
2002). GSCC exercises its right of pair-off on opening-leg fails of 
blind-brokered RPs (GSCC Important Notice GSCC054.96, dated 
July 9, 1996, p. 4). In April 2002, GSCC introduced an automated 
pair-off process for members that have receive and deliver obligations 
for identical principal amounts of the same security (GSCC Important 
Notice GSCC018.02, dated March 1, 2002). GSCC important notices 
are posted at <http://www.gscc.com>.Endnotes (Continued)
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13. However, some participants have, on rare occasions, reversed in 
securities at even negative specials rates when a settlement fail would 
entail an additional penalty. Such penalties can arise in failing to settle 
short futures positions and guaranteed delivery sales.
14. This process was not flawless. Not all of the dealers had reported 
all of their brokered trades to GSCC, so GSCC failed to capture one 
side of some brokered trades and failed to capture other brokered 
trades entirely. The omissions were ultimately corrected in the course 
of a prolonged and painstaking reconciliation process.
15. In some cases, a GSCC member made good delivery to GSCC on 
September 11 but GSCC nevertheless recorded a fail in the absence of 
knowledge of the delivery (GSCC Important Notice GSCC068.01).
16. Such pair-offs were part of the original design of the program for 
blind-brokered RPs. See GSCC Important Notice GSCC054.96, p. 4.
17. See the discussion of marking fails to market in endnote 11. 
In some cases, GSCC marked fails to market erroneously and created 
erroneous revised delivery instructions because it did not know that 
members had in fact made good delivery on September 11 (GSCC 
Important Notice GSCC087.01).
18. Prior to 2001, Treasury overtly tailored the sale of a coupon-
bearing security to market conditions on only one occasion—in 
November 1992, when it reopened the 6 3/8 percent ten-year note 
maturing August 15, 2002, “in order to alleviate an acute, protracted 
shortage” (Office of Financing press release, dated November 3, 
1992). However, that action amounted to no more than a decision to 
reopen the ten-year note in a regularly scheduled auction in lieu of 
selling a new note. In contrast, the note sale on October 4, 2001, was a 
reopening in an unscheduled snap auction.
Between 1979 and 2001, Treasury conducted two snap auctions of 
cash management bills, on May 30, 1980, and April 6, 1993. Both 
auctions came promptly after Congressional action to extend or 
increase the statutory ceiling on the federal debt and were the result of 
Treasury’s need for cash rather than an unusual demand for the 
securities by market participants (Wall Street Journal 1980, 1993).
19. Market participants had been aware of chronic settlement fails in 
the five-year note since late September (Dow Jones Newswire 2001a). 
At the time Treasury announced the reopening of the ten-year note, it 
stated that “we will observe how effective this is at trying to deal [with 
the fails problem]. We will then consider whether a similar 
extraordinary auction of five years is something we might do next 
week” (Bloomberg 2001b).
20. Although the 45 percent limit was reimposed after three weeks, the 
limit was subsequently raised to 65 percent on May 15, 2002. The May 
2002 changes are posted at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/pihome/
news/opnmktops/2002/an020424.html>.
21. One reason SOMA owned only $1 billion of the ten-year note was 
that the security had just been issued in August and was not scheduled 
to be reopened until November. After the November reopening, 
SOMA ownership jumped to $2.6 billion. (SOMA could not 
participate in the unscheduled October reopening because it did not 
have any contemporaneously maturing securities that it could roll 
over.)
22. It is possible, however, that the facility could have a more 
significant effect on specialness by reducing lenders’ concerns 
regarding chronic fails, leading to an expansion in the supply schedule 
of securities available for lending and a reduction in the time period 
over which an issue trades near a specials rate of zero.
23. Duffie (1996) explains why issue specialness should be reflected in 
securities prices, and Jordan and Jordan (1997) present empirical 
evidence supporting the hypothesis. Such specialness can be expected 
to be incorporated into prices at auction, leading to lower Treasury 
borrowing costs (all else equal).
24. The Bank of England’s RP rate is the official short-term rate at 
which the bank lends to the money market and accordingly 
implements monetary policy (Bank of England 1999).References
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